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Recent formal models of accountability allow us to make different conditional predictions about 
how transparency affects voters’ willingness to reelect incumbents and acceptance of higher 
taxes. We review two models and investigate empirical implications derived from or related to 
them, using panel data from 1972-2000 for U.S. state budget process transparency, gubernatorial 
elections, and tax increases in a small structural model. We do not find that budget transparency 
has a direct effect on incumbent retention, but we do find clear evidence that increased 
transparency dampens the negative effect of tax increases on retention of incumbent governors. 
Independent of this, we also find that increased transparency leads to greater fiscal scale. We 
suggest some possible directions for future models based on our results. 
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Voters in representative democracies mainly hold politicians accountable through 
periodic elections. Elections and electoral accountability can constrain opportunistic behavior by 
incumbents. If incumbents value future terms in office enough, the threat of being replaced by a 
challenger reduces the chance that politicians will take actions which are not in the interests of 
the electorate. Moreover, elections also enable voters selectively to retain good incumbents. If 
politicians have heterogeneous preferences, for instance, then those with preferences closer to 
those of the electorate will have a higher probability of re-election, other things equal.  
 The literature on political agency, the calculations voters and politicians make in a 
principal-agent framework, has produced important insights about the possibilities and limits of 
using elections to control the behavior of politicians and/or select ”good" types of politicians.1 
Within a larger agency literature, a small number of studies ask “What is the effect of 
government transparency on accountability, that is, on voters’ ability to control politicians via 
the re-election mechanism?”2 Transparency is often considered beneficial in information-scarce 
contexts because it “work[s] through increasing the amount of information available to voters” 
(Besley 2006: 196). Equally, however, as Przeworski (2003: 157) writes, “Information is not 
scarce: in fact, it is abundant. But extracting a signal – the true state of affairs – is difficult.” 
Consistent with a tradition of looking for ways in which institutions can promote “clarity of 
responsibility” (Powell and Whitten 1993), this paper asks whether and how transparent budget 
institutions can help make voters less apt to punish “good” politicians by kicking them out of 
office, thereby increasing accountability.3 
                                                
1 A sampling of the literature includes Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Austen-Smith and 
Banks (1989), Rogoff (1990), Banks and Sundaram (1993, 1998), Harrington (1993), Fearon (1999), Smart and 
Sturm (2003, 2006), and Besley and Smart (2007). 
2 This literature includes Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001), Maskin and Tirole (2004), Stasavage (2007), 
Prat (2005), Hood and Heald (2006), and Besley (2006). 
3 Lowry and Alt (2001) show how institutions like balanced budget laws help bond market participants coordinate 
on solutions to the sort of problem voters face. 
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 We do so by examining the following set of relationships using data on gubernatorial 
elections, fiscal policy, and budget transparency in U.S. states. If voters dislike taxes, higher  tax 
growth would reduce the retention of incumbent politicians. We ask empirically whether it does 
so.  Next, suppose increased transparency enables voters to better observe the justification for tax 
increases, whether in comparison to situations where information is unavailable or where it is 
difficult to extract from a cacophony of claims and counter-claims. In that case transparency 
could reduce the retention costs to incumbents of raising taxes. A related question then is 
whether transparency increases tax growth, holding the current scale of taxation constant. We 
examine both those issues as well. Finally, we see whether these relationships hold up even if we 
treat transparency (and its interaction with tax growth) as endogenous.  
A long empirical literature on accountability shows that incumbents (or candidates from 
the incumbent party) are rewarded or punished for good or bad economic and fiscal policy 
outcomes. With respect to state elections, several papers find evidence that incumbent candidates 
or candidates from the incumbent party do better in gubernatorial elections following a period of 
state economic prosperity (Besley and Case 1995; Chubb 1988; Lowry, Alt and Ferree 1998; 
Niemi, Stanley and Vogel 1995). Conversely, voters tend to punish incumbent governors running 
for reelection following tax increases (Kone and Winters 1993; Niemi, Stanley and Vogel 1995), 
particularly if taxes increased more than in neighboring states (Besley and Case 1995). Lowry, 
Alt and Ferree (1998) find that the candidate from the incumbent governor's party may be 
punished at the ballot box for changes in fiscal scale relative to expectations. Apart from the 
cross-sectional results of Alt, Lassen, and Skilling (2002), however, no literature considers the 
effect of transparency on the relationship between taxes and re-election in U.S. states, though 
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Ferraz and Finan (2008) show that public audits reduce corruption and increase the probability of 
incumbent retention in Brazilian municipalities. 
The paper proceeds as follows: We first briefly discuss formal models of transparency by 
Besley (2006) and Ferejohn (1999), which show how the effects in which we are interested can 
arise within a formal model. We describe conditions under which it is possible to extract some of 
our specific predictions about the relationships between incumbent retention, tax growth, and 
budget transparency from these models. Nevertheless, other predictions we test only follow from 
the models under unobservable conditions, so our empirical work should not really be regarded 
as a test of these models.  
We then describe our data and empirical specifications. The bulk of the paper contains 
empirical results from a small structural model that embodies the relationships among the 
probability an incumbent governor is reelected, tax increases, and budget transparency. We first 
estimate a three-stage least squares model of the full system, then conduct sensitivity analysis of 
the full system as well as single-equation models. We use data on budget procedures in U.S. 
states to measure and endogenize transparency.4 Our estimation results show that incumbent 
governors are punished less for tax increases that occur under more transparent budget 
procedures. Furthermore, the estimates of the growth of real per capita income and sales taxes 
show that tax growth is higher where transparency is greater. Sensitivity analysis reveals that the 
effect of transparency on fiscal scale is mostly driven by cases with Republican governors, not 
Democrats; we speculate about why partisan effects like this could arise and suggest future 
directions for models of transparency. 
                                                
4 We also consider media penetration rates as an alternative information source. 
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FORMAL MODELS OF TRANSPARENCY  
 The literature on transparency is growing. The concept of transparency is often “used 
imprecisely to refer to a number of characteristics of an open system …" (Garrett and Vermeule 
2008: 68). We use the term to refer to rules for the construction and reporting of budgets that 
make what Besley (2006) refers to as "policy relevant" information more accessible or credible. 
One should not assume that transparency is always beneficial: it need not be.5 In the case of pure 
moral hazard, increasing observability can be counter-productive if it leads to “pandering” 
(Canes-Wrone et al 2001). If an agent does better by acting according to preconceived 
expectations, she might also ignore potentially valuable private signals, to the detriment of the 
principal (Prat 2005; Stasavage 2007). However, if the choice of transparency is endogenous, in 
equilibrium no agent who chooses more transparency then takes a “bad” action (Ferejohn 1999).  
Further complications arise if elections are a mechanism for selecting incumbents of 
different “types”6 as well as a means of disciplining incumbents. Transparency can help screen 
out bad types, yet this may also have some undesirable consequences. Suppose increasing 
transparency increases the probability of a bad type actually being exposed, the “screening” 
effect, and decreases equilibrium rents extracted, the “discipline” effect (Besley and Prat 2005). 
Then there is a fundamental trade-off: greater discipline can make screening harder. 
Formal models that address the relationship between transparency, policy choices, and 
incumbent accountability are less common. We look at two models in which the effects in which 
we are interested can exist. First, in the strategic situation Ferejohn (1999) studies, an incumbent 
                                                
5 In Prat (2005), if outcomes are observed, transparency is good. In Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009), transparent 
revenues are larger (because of efficiency) and thus it is easier to fund wasteful transfers, but of course voters have 
to like wasteful transfers. In Dal Bo (2007) secrecy is better when individual accountability is weak, and there is a 
part-whole problem: if voters are too likely to vote against incumbents who vote against bad projects, it is better to 
have secret voting. See also Levy (2007) and Gavazza and Lizzeri (2008). 
6 See Fearon (1999), Persson and Tabellini (2000), Ashworth (2005). 
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politician first commits to a level of transparency. Thus transparency is endogenous: the agent 
chooses how observable to make her actions. Voters next decide how much to invest in the 
government; Ferejohn assumes that rents (incumbent compensation) are proportional to the scale 
of government. Then, the politician takes some action that produces an outcome, an amount of 
public goods, subject to a cost shock. Voters observe the outcome and, if they so chose when 
deciding about investment, a noisy signal of the action taken, where noise is inversely related to 
transparency.7 Finally, voters decide whether to retain the politician or replace her with another 
from the same pool.  
Ferejohn shows that politicians have incentives to choose nonzero levels of transparency 
which lead to “greater investment” (larger fiscal scale or higher taxes) and thus more 
compensation than if the politician's action remained completely hidden. Agent discipline also 
increases as transparency increases. Conditional on the choice to monitor actions, i.e. when 
voters evaluate incumbents based on their policy choices rather than eventual outcomes, the 
probability of re-election also increases with transparency, as we show in Appendix 1. Moreover, 
when transparency is endogenous and voters conditionally commit to use action monitoring, 
Ferejohn’s model predicts that increased transparency diminishes the negative impact of taxes on 
retention, since in equilibrium at the margin transparency increases fiscal scale and incumbents 
get re-elected. In addition to showing how the direct and indirect effects of transparency on 
incumbent retention could exist in equilibrium (conditional on the choice of action monitoring). 
Ferejohn’s model provides a rationale for treating transparency as endogenous. However, since 
choosing action monitoring is unobservable, our estimates are not strictly a test of this model.  
Besley (2006, Chs. 3-4) develops a two-period model of screening and discipline in 
which politicians make tax policy choices in situations of more and less transparency. Elected 
                                                
7 The signal voters receive is essentially a noisy signal of the cost shock. 
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politicians raise taxes and spend on public goods, which voters observe when deciding about re-
election. Bad incumbents maximize the diversion of rents to themselves while good types 
maximize social welfare. Incumbents have private information about personal rent diversion and 
cost shocks (a “high” cost shock makes public goods relatively expensive). Voters have beliefs 
about how likely are high or low cost shocks in any period, and have to infer whether the tax rate 
indicates rent diversion, given the proportion of politicians who are “good”. In general, 
equilibrium again depends on the extent to which bad types show discipline by mimicking good 
types and the voters’ cost beliefs and re-election rule. If the ex post probability that the 
incumbent is a "good" type conditional on observed taxes and public spending exceeds the 
proportion of all politicians who are "good," then voters reelect (Besley 2006, 187).8  
There are three equilibria: pooling, separating, and “hybrid”. In the pooling equilibrium, 
bad types mimic good types given a low cost shock: incumbents set taxes as if costs were low (a 
bigger tax bill or public sector) but provide less public goods (as if costs were high) and divert 
the difference to themselves. In the separating equilibrium, good incumbents supply public goods 
and are re-elected, while bad incumbents set maximal taxes and grab rents before being replaced 
with certainty.9 The tax rate pooling incumbents set is lower than what bad types choose when 
forgoing reelection entirely in the separating equilibrium. The magnitude of the effect of the tax 
rate on voter support for incumbents thus depends on which equilibrium arises. Nevertheless, 
Besley (2006, pp. 193-194) shows that across all of the model’s equilibria higher taxes increase 
turnover: that is, they reduce the retention rate or incline voters to be less supportive of 
                                                
8 Note that the two models we review are not consistent with each other. In Ferejohn’s model all politicians are 
"bad" types, that is, motivated only by rents, so the model has no screening effects and focuses entirely on moral 
hazard issues. Besley (2006, p. 193) remarks on the incompatibility between voters' commitment to a standard for 
evaluating actions and the presence of good types. 
9 In the hybrid equilibrium bad incumbents adopt a mixed strategy, pooling with probability q/(1-q). The case arises 
when voters believe the probability of being in the high cost state (q) is not sufficient to induce unconditional 
pooling by incumbents. 
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incumbents.10  Besley claims empirical support for this result (2006, Tables 3.2 and 3.3), and we 
re-examine that empirical work in our own estimates below.  
How does transparency affect the relationship between retention and the scale of taxation 
in this model? With regard to retention itself, more transparency in the form of a probabilistic 
signal of the true cost state can in equilibrium help voters choose good types for reelection. 
However, this also reduces the incentive for bad types to mimic good types, so the effect of this 
sort of ex post informative transparency on retention depends on how these selection and 
discipline effects balance, with a sign that depends on the (unobservable) proportion of good 
types.11 In terms of the tax rate, transparency about the cost shock makes the separating 
equilibrium more likely and pooling less likely. Incumbents who pool set tax rates lower in the 
first period but higher in the second. Therefore, whether transparency raises or lowers taxes 
depends on unobservable parameters like discount rates, the relative size of maximal taxes versus 
a low-cost public sector, as well as the proportion of good types. Without placing restrictions on 
these parameters, we cannot unambiguously sign the interaction between transparency and how 
strongly tax changes affect retention, though in general higher taxes should reduce incumbent 
retention.  
Nevertheless, inspired by these models even if not always directly testing them, we 
examine the following set of questions. Does higher tax growth reduce and transparency increase 
the retention of incumbent politicians? Is more transparency associated with tax growth, holding 
the current scale of taxation constant? Moreover, does increased budget transparency diminish 
                                                
10 There is a non-monotonicity in one equilibrium in which retention can increase between lowest and moderate 
levels of taxation, but falls above moderate levels. 
11 In the hybrid equilibrium, increasing transparency can increase the probability that good types survive, offsetting 
the effect of transparency on equilibrium rents from pooling (or hybrid) which “tends to reduce discipline” so that 
“bad incumbents are less likely to survive re-election” (pp. 204-5). But this raises the posterior probability that a 
better outcome was produced by a good type, changing the voters’ re-election rule and thus the equilibrium. In a 
different way, if good types are always retained, anything that increases the quality of the candidate pool ex ante will 
increase retention and any transparency that takes the form of pre-screening candidates could do that. 
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the effect of raising taxes on retention of incumbents, as both models (conditionally) predict? 
And finally, do these relationships hold up if we treat transparency (and its interaction with tax 
growth) as endogenous?  
 
DATA AND SPECIFICATION 
To examine these relationships, we use panel data from the American states. We first 
estimate a three-equation model in which the endogenous variables are incumbent retention, 
changes in the level of taxation, and budget transparency. Each equation includes one or more 
endogenous variables on the right-hand side; additionally, the interaction between transparency 
and tax changes is included in the retention equation. The sample period is 1972-2000. All 
monetary values are reported in constant 1982 dollars, using the national CPI-U deflator. Alaska 
and Hawaii are omitted (lacking data on candidate characteristics), as are Minnesota in 1972 and 
Nebraska in all years (lacking measures of legislative competition) and as are a handful of cases 
with independent governors. 
Data 
We first define the three main endogenous variables, followed by the explanatory 
variables, then the specification and expectations. Details on sources and descriptive statistics are 
in Table 1.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Retention:  Retention is a dummy variable coded one if an incumbent governor is 
reelected. Following Besley (2006), we limit the data to cases where the governor is eligible to 
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run for reelection, and treat cases where the incumbent voluntarily chooses not to run as 
defeats.12 Insofar as we can, we subsequently examine the effects of alternative codings. 
Tax changes: Our fiscal scale variable is the two-year rate of changes in taxation, based 
on the sum of real, per capita personal and corporate income and general and selective sales tax 
revenue. Subsequent analyses examine different definitions of taxes.  
Transparency:  Endogenous transparency is measured as an index based on nine items 
reflecting different aspects of budget transparency, including whether all appropriations are 
included in a single bill, reporting follows GAAP or includes multi-year expenditure forecasts 
and performance measures, and independent or non-executive agencies create the revenue 
forecast. The full set of items is listed in Appendix 2.13  In the spirit of Besley’s and Ferejohn’s 
models, we interpret this transparency as “conveying more or better information” about fiscal 
policy or the cost of public spending (or even policy choice), rather than open access to the 
policy process or personal character or past records of candidates. To deal with missing items, 
we re-cast the transparency variable as the ratio of items coded "yes" to the total items 
answered.14  
                                                
12 Besley’s Table 3 contains cross section-time series estimates of linear models for the probability of re-election and 
per cent of votes received by the winner. Another alternative would be to code the dependent variable as one if the 
incumbent party is retained. However, we lack data on individual candidate traits for non-incumbents. Using the 
incumbent candidate's share of the vote introduces other complications such as how to handle minor parties and 
independent candidates, so we do not pursue this. We discuss some additional results ahead in the section on 
sensitivity analysis. 
13  Data is based on publications of the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) and the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) and on a follow-up survey of state budget officers. The result is annual 
fiscal transparency scores for each state for each year between 1972 and 2002, about 1500 observations of nine 
dichotomous budget procedures, as well as an index equal to the number of items for which each state had the more 
transparent procedure. Some items could not be reconstructed for all states in all years, but no case is missing more 
than two items, so overall about 97 per cent of the items are present. 
14 This method can induce some oddities. For example, if a state had three items coded “yes” out of eight for which 
there was data, and then in a subsequent year we recorded a “yes” on the item that was missing earlier, the state’s 
transparency score would go from .375 (3 of 8) to .444 (4 of 9), even though it is possible that no real change 
actually took place. 
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We also introduce an alternative measure of transparency, media penetration, as a control 
variable in some specifications. This variable aggregates newspaper circulation and cable 
reception by state and year: details appear in Appendix 2. 
Economic cycle:  Existing literature indicates that any of incumbent retention, tax 
changes and indeed transparency could be affected by cyclical economic changes. We include, 
where appropriate, measures of the state unemployment rate and growth rates of real income per 
capita, real expenditures per capita, real per capita federal revenue transfers, and the lagged 
growth rate of real per capita debt, all measured in per cent, as well as the lagged level of real tax 
revenue per capita.  
Incumbent characteristics: Once again following Besley, we include the incumbent's vote 
share in the last election, an indicator for those governors retiring voluntarily, and a vector of 
variables describing the incumbent: age, training as a lawyer, years of work before becoming 
governor, fraction of previous experience in politics, and total years of education. 
Other explanatory variables: Besley includes (the log of) state population in the retention 
equation, so we do as well. Following Alt, Lassen, and Rose (2006), we also include measures of 
legislative competition, political polarization, and the presence of divided government in our 
budget transparency equation. Construction of these variables is discussed in Appendix 2. We 
also include full sets of unit and year fixed effects in those equations in which they are jointly 
statistically significant. 
Specification and Expectations 
Retention:  To show how our results relate to his, the linear probability model for 
incumbent retention follows Besley's (2006: Table 3.2, column 4) specification. We expect that 
the (endogenous) two-year growth rate of real income and sales taxes per capita has a negative 
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effect. An interaction term (see below for the instrument) between transparency and the growth 
in taxes (both endogenous) should have a positive effect, if more transparency reduces the vote 
costs of raising taxes, a (conditional) prediction of both models. We include direct effects of 
(endogenous) budget transparency and media penetration as well as unemployment, real income 
and expenditure growth, the natural log of state population, the incumbent's vote share in the last 
election, and personal characteristics. Conditional on appearing in other equations, all fixed 
effects are jointly insignificant in this equation and we consequently omit them. Identification in 
this equation comes through the exogeneous economic variables in the tax growth equation, 
exogenous determinants of budget transparency, and fixed effects variables. 
Tax changes: We use a specification based on Alt and Lowry (1994, 2000). Explanatory 
variables include (endogenous) incumbent retention and transparent budget procedures: 
following Ferejohn, the latter could have a positive effect. We also include media penetration, 
expecting the same effect. We include the indicator for governors retiring voluntarily and 
economic controls: lagged tax revenue, unemployment, and change in real per capita income, 
federal revenue transfers, and lagged growth in real per capita debt. Identification comes through 
the exogenous variables in the retention and transparency equations, and fixed time effects. It 
may be argued that the growth in expenditures in the retention equation is not exogenous with 
respect to tax growth, but dropping this variable would risk omitted variable bias in the retention 
equation (Lowry , Alt and Ferree 1998). Note that expenditure growth is measured using all 
general expenditures regardless of the revenue source, whereas the growth in taxes is limited to 
revenue from income and sales taxes.  We return to this issue in our sensitivity analysis, after 
presenting our main results.  This equation also includes a full set of unit fixed effects. 
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Transparency:  Neither Besley nor Ferejohn offer a model that explains variations in 
transparency. Ferejohn suggests that the party most favorable to large government might prefer 
more transparency (1999, p. 152), but heterogeneous policy preferences are not part of his 
model. We include (endogenous) tax changes to allow for the possibility that decisions on taxes 
(incumbent performance) precede decisions about offering transparency. Based on Alt, Lassen, 
and Rose (2006), we expect that the effects of legislative competition, political polarization, and 
the presence of divided government will be positive, and these provide identification.15 The 
equation also includes a full set of unit fixed effects. 
Transparency-tax change interaction: The product of two endogenous variables is itself 
endogenous, but instrumenting budget transparency and tax growth separately and then 
multiplying their predicted values produces inconsistent coefficients (Achen 1986; Wooldridge 
2002, 236-237).16 We therefore include a fourth equation to create an instrument for the 
endogenous interaction: it includes the two endgogenous variables (transparency and tax 
changes) and a full set of year fixed effects, which enter the system only through this equation.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We initially estimated our structural model using three-stage least squares to allow for 
simultaneous causation between incumbent retention, tax growth and budget transparency.17 This 
imposes a number of restrictions, however. It requires that we estimate the dichotomous outcome 
                                                
15 Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) argue that polarization could lead to an increase in transparency because incumbents 
want to tie the hands of possible successors, or it could decrease the likelihood of an increase in transparency 
because it makes it more difficult to reach agreement on changes. Their empirical results imply that the former effect 
dominates. Stasavage (2007) presents a formal model in which causation goes the other direction: transparency leads 
to polarization as office holders feel the need to make statements and take stands that appeal to certain constituents. 
"Transparency" for Stasavage means open debate, as opposed to legislators meeting in closed session. It is not clear 
how well his model applies to the kinds of budget procedures we study. Coglianese et al. (2009) explicitly 
distinguish transparency from public participation in their Task Force Report. 
16This is an example of the so-called "forbidden regression." 
17 All models in this paper were estimated using Stata version 9.2. 
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for incumbent retention using a linear probability model; it limits the cases used for each 
equation to election years where the incumbent is eligible to run and cases where there are no 
missing data for any variable in the system; and it does not allow for robust or clustered standard 
errors.18 We then conducted a series of single-equation analyses of our retention, tax growth and 
budget transparency models treating all right-hand side variables as exogenous. This allows us to 
experiment with various changes in specification, functional form, data sample, and standard 
errors and other estimation assumptions.    
Three-stage least squares 
Table 2 shows the results for our structural model estimated with three-stage least 
squares. The effects of transparency are shown in the incumbent retention and tax growth 
equations. Neither budget transparency nor media penetration has a direct, statistically 
significant effect on incumbent retention. The negative effect of tax growth on retention found 
by Besley is evident. However, the coefficient on the interaction between budget transparency 
and tax growth is positive and significant. Thus, the negative effect of tax growth is significantly 
dampened in states with high budget transparency. Several of the control variables also affect 
incumbent retention, in the expected directions. Higher unemployment rates lower the 
probability of retention and higher income growth raises it, although both effects are only 
marginally significant. Older incumbents are less likely to be retained, but controlling for age, 
those with more experience and a larger fraction of their careers spent in politics are more likely 
to be retained. 
[Table 2 about here] 
                                                
18  Standard errors are not clustered in our three-stage least squares model in part because the Stata's REG3 
command does not have that option, but also because theory suggests that the observations should be clustered by 
incumbent governor for our retention equation and by state for the tax growth and transparency equations. 
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The predicted effect of tax growth conditional on budget transparency is shown in Figure 
1, which shows the change in the predicted probability of retention for a 15 percent increase in 
taxes compared to a 5 percent decrease (these are roughly the 95th and 5th percentiles in our data). 
At the lowest level of transparency in our data, the negative change in the predicted probability is 
greater than 1.0 in absolute value; this infeasible effect is due to the fact that we are using a 
linear probability model. More important, the upper bound of the 90 percent confidence interval 
is below zero for values of budget transparency below 5/9, and above zero for higher values. At 
very high levels of transparency, this model predicts that greater tax growth can actually increase 
the probability of retention, though there are not very many observations at the very highest 
levels of transparency. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Turning to the tax growth equation, both budget transparency and media penetration have 
positive, significant effects on the growth of per capita income and sales taxes. Recall that 
Besley's model is inconclusive with respect to the effect of transparency on fiscal scale, but 
Ferejohn predicts that greater transparency leads to greater investment (higher taxes) by voters. 
Again, a number of control variables also have statistically significant effects: the rate of tax 
growth is negatively associated with lagged per capita levels and the unemployment rate. It is 
positively associated with the growth rates of per capita income and federal transfers, and there is 
a marginally significant, positive association with lagged growth in state debt.19 Predicted tax 
growth may be higher when the incumbent chooses not to run for reelection, though this is not 
significant at the 90 percent level. The endogenous probability that an incumbent who runs will 
                                                
19 The positive effect of federal transfers could well be due to the importance of matching funds (e.g., Medicaid) in 
state revenues. Any negative (substitution) effect of federal for state own-source dollars might be dominated by the 
positive, matching-funds effect. We urge caution in interpreting the estimated effect of federal transfers as causal. 
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be reelected has no discernable effect on tax increases. Finally, the unit fixed effects (not shown) 
are jointly significant at the 99 percent level.  
Finally, consistent with Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006), states that are politically polarized 
and have highly competitive legislatures tend to choose higher levels of budget transparency. 
The coefficients on endogenous tax growth and divided government are positive but not 
significant at the 90 percent confidence level. Much of the predictive power of our budget 
transparency equation comes from the unit fixed effects, as budget transparency varies much 
more across states than over time within states. 
Sensitivity analysis: 3SLS 
We first reestimated our system of equations using seemingly unrelated regression, then 
performed a Hausman test on the results compared to our 3SLS model. We were able to reject 
the null hypothesis of no systematic differences in the coefficients, which supports 3SLS and 
indicates that we need to account for endogeneity. We then estimated the system without the 
growth in expenditures variable in the retention equation.  There are only minor shifts in the 
coefficients or standard errors for the remaining variables, and the implications for our 
hypotheses of interest do not change at all. Similarly, using a nonlinear coding for the 
incumbent’s age or dropping all of the incumbent’s personal attributes except age have only 
minimal effects.  
Our measure of budget transparency is bounded by zero and one, and therefore does not 
satisfy the classic assumptions of the linear regression model.  We reestimated the model using a 
logistic transformation of our budget transparency variable.20 All of our key results are 
qualitatively the same. We also estimated the system using two-stage least squares and obtained 
                                                
20  We arbitrarily recoded four cases where transparency is zero as 0.05 before making the transformation. We added 
a constant to the transformed index so that all values are nonnegative in order to make interpretation of the 
interaction term feasible. 
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substantially similar results, save that the effects of media penetration on tax growth is 
significant at the 90 percent level rather than the 95 percent level.  
We then reestimated the system with 3SLS using different subsets of the data.  We first 
used only those cases where the incumbent governor chose to run for reelection. The number of 
cases drops from 263 to 205, but our main results hold up. The coefficient on tax growth in the 
retention equation is positive, the coefficient on the interaction between tax growth and budget 
transparency is negative, and both are significant at the 99 percent level. In the tax growth 
equation, the coefficient on budget transparency is positive and significant at the 99 percent 
level; the coefficient on media penetration is positive, but loses significance. The effects of 
political polarization and legislative competition remain positive and significant at the 95 percent 
level in the budget transparency equation. 
Next, we omitted all cases for the southern and border states that tend to have more 
conservative fiscal policies (Alt and Lowry 1994). This reduces the number of cases to 195. The 
main results of interest in the retention and tax growth equations are qualitatively similar to 
Table 2. The coefficient on media penetration is less precisely estimated in the tax growth 
equation, but is still significant at the 90 percent level. In the budget transparency equation, 
polarization has a positive, significant effect, the effect of divided government is positive but not 
quite significant at the 90 percent level, while the effect of legislative competition is 
insignificant. Nevertheless, the main structural effects of interest remain evident. 
If we add a full set of year fixed effects to the tax growth equation, the results for the 
incumbent retention and budget transparency equations are essentially unchanged. Most 
important, the coefficient (|z-score|) in the retention equation is -5.07 (4.07) for tax growth and 
9.91 (3.39) for tax growth*budget transparency. In the tax growth equation, the effects of media 
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penetration and the growth in income and state debt are suppressed, but the coefficient (|z-score|) 
is 1.06 (3.71) for budget transparency. In addition, the effect of an incumbent who does not run 
for reelection is positive and significant at the 95 percent level. Overall, the qualitative 
interpretation of the results is essentially the same as in Table 2. 
Extensive investigation of outliers and influential observations indicates that the only 
effect which is at all sensitive to the exclusion of particular cases is the effect of budget 
transparency on tax growth. However, there is no theoretical reason to exclude selected cases, 
and otherwise the results are very robust.21 The coefficients on tax growth and tax growth 
interacted with transparency in the retention equation are always significant at the 95 percent 
level, while the coefficient on tax growth in the transparency equation is never significant.   
Finally, we consider alternative treatments of fixed effects. An intriguing result arises 
when we estimate the system with all 263 cases but include fixed unit effects (even though 
jointly insignificant) in the incumbent retention equation. The effects of tax growth conditional 
on budget transparency remain, but we also get a positive, significant coefficient on budget 
transparency itself and a negative, marginally significant (|z| = 1.79) coefficient on media 
penetration.22 However, this version of the model also generates a negative R-squared for the 
                                                
21  We investigated outliers by generating residuals for the 3SLS model and then focusing on cases where the 
absolute value of the residual exceeds the root mean square error in at least two of the three equations for retention, 
tax growth, and transparency. If we exclude cases that have large residuals in both the retention and transparency 
equations, then the effect of transparency on tax growth is not significant. If we exclude cases with large residuals in 
any other combination of equations, the effect of transparency on tax growth is positive and significant at the 95 
percent level. We then checked for influential observations using single-equation models and calculating Cook's 
distance, DFITS, and DFBETA for our key explanatory variables. Looking across the results, it appears that Rhode 
Island is particularly influential, but excluding Rhode Island from the 3SLS model has no effect on the results. 
Finally, we excluded each of the other states one at a time. All of our key results remain. 
22 Besley (2006, Ch. 3) provides a model without taxes in which incumbents choose whether or not to make a policy 
decision consonant with voters’ wishes and voters receive signals of the incumbent’s type and policy choice. This 
empirical result resonates with that model if we interpret media penetration as providing information about 
incumbent's type and budget transparency as providing information about policy actions  
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incumbent retention equation,23 so ultimately we chose to omit unit fixed effects from the 
incumbent retention equation in Table 2. They are jointly insignificant in that equation, at least 
conditional on being included in some of the other equations. 
Sensitivity analysis: Retention 
 Table 3 shows some single-equation results for our incumbent retention model with 
measures of transparency.24 The first column shows a linear probability model with all regressors 
treated as exogenous. Standard errors are adjusted assuming that observations are clustered by 
incumbent governor. Results for this model are similar to the incumbent retention equation in our 
structural model in Table 2, though omitting considerations of endogeneity does affect the tax 
growth coefficients. The second column shows a maximum likelihood Probit model that is more 
appropriate for our dichotomous dependent variable, with standard errors again calculated for 
observations clustered by incumbent governor.25  The result for this model is qualitatively similar 
to the linear probability model in column 1, though of course the nonlinear form makes the 
coefficients look different, in a way that is consequential for the model’s predictions. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 Figure 2 shows the effect of tax growth conditional on transparency predicted by our 
Probit model.26  Now the entire 90 percent confidence interval lies within the feasible range, due 
to the Probit specification. Other than that, the predicted effects look similar to those for the 
                                                
23 Because final coefficients are calculated using the instrumented values while R-squared is calculated using the 
actual data, it is possible for the model to do a worse job of predicting than the mean value of the dependent 
variable, resulting in a negative R-squared.  
24 Sub-period estimation shows that Besley’s (2006: Table 3.2) statistically significant coefficients for the growth in 
taxes and income using data for 1950-1996 are driven primarily by the earlier years in his data set, largely before our 
transparency data begins. Besley also inadvertently used the growth rate of nominal, aggregate personal income. 
25  We tried to estimate a model with endogenous transparency using Stata's IVPROBIT command, but it would not 
converge. 
26  Results in Figure 2 were generated using Tomz, Wittenberg and King's (2001) CLARIFY program, which does 
not support three-stage least squares. For Figure 1, we calculated the conditional standard errors from the variance-
covariance matrix for the incumbent retention equation. 
 19 
linear probability model shown in Figure 1. At low levels of budget transparency, an increase in 
tax growth has a negative, statistically significant effect on the probability of retention. The 
negative effect is dampened as transparency increases, and the mean predicted effect reaches 
zero when our transparency index equals 5/9. For this model, the 90 percent confidence interval 
still includes zero even at very high levels of transparency. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Sensitivity analysis: Tax changes  
 Table 4 shows single-equation results for our model of tax changes. All equations are 
estimated using Plümper and Troeger's (2007) fixed-effects vector decomposition model with 
budget transparency treated as rarely changing. Plümper and Troeger show that their method 
produces more reliable estimates than a fixed effects regression with rarely changing 
independent variables, as long as the unobserved correlation between these variables and unit 
effects is small.27 Model (1) replicates the specification from our structural model. but without a 
dummy for whether the governor runs and is retained, because this cannot be exogenous to tax 
growth over the two years prior to the election. The results are very similar, except that the 
coefficient on budget transparency is positive but  significant at only the 90 percent confidence 
level. We also estimated a series of models for fiscal scale measured in levels, i.e., real, per 
capita sales and income taxes. The same basic results emerge. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Model (2) adds fixed year effects. The main consequence is that the coefficients on 
income growth and growth in state debt are no longer statistically significant. The effect of 
budget transparency is positive and significant at the 90 percent level, while the effect of media 
                                                
27  There is no bright line rule for when a variable should be treated as rarely changing, except that the ratio of its 
between- to within-variation must exceed one. For budget transparency, the ratio of between- to within-standard 
deviations is 2.35. 
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penetration is smaller, but still significant at the 95 percent level. Model (3) includes non-
election years and years when the incumbent is term limited. This increases the number of cases 
by a factor of five. Now the coefficients on budget transparency and income are positive and 
significant at the 99 percent level, and lagged growth in state debt is significant at the 90 percent 
level. Media penetration and the growth in federal transfers become insignificant. Adding fixed 
year effects and expanding the data set thus causes the size and statistical significance of the 
transparency and fiscal variable coefficients to shift, but does not alter the overall conclusion 
implied by the structural model. 
Neither Besley nor Ferejohn allows for heterogeneous policy preferences among either 
politicians or voters, but as part of the sensitivity analysis we considered whether the tax change 
results might vary by party. An intriguing empirical result emerged. We now add a dummy 
variable for Republican governor and an interaction term for Republican governor with budget 
transparency: as column (4) shows, the Republican governor coefficient is negative, the 
interaction term is positive, and both are significant at the 99 percent level. If we estimate the 
same model for election years only, point estimates for all coefficients are remarkably similar, 
but neither partisan effect is statistically significant.28  
That result has a straightforward interpretation. Previous research indicates that 
politicians' preferences affect fiscal policy (Alt and Lowry 1994, 2001; Reed 2006), and the 
effect of transparency might be conditional on these preferences. For example, Republicans are 
more likely to oppose tax increases, and are expected by voters to do so (Lowry, Alt and Ferree 
1998). They may be unwilling to support tax increases even when increases are justified unless 
                                                




voters can be convinced that the increase is really necessary, which is more likely to happen if 
the process is transparent.  
Finally, if we include variables for the partisanship of the Governor interacted with tax 
changes and the interactions of that variable with transparency in the Probit retention equation of 
Table 3, we observe that the signs are the same regardless of party, but the effects are strikingly 
bigger (and more statistically significant) for Republican governors. However, we lack valid 
instruments for all these interactions, and so choose not to try to incorporate this result in the 
structural model.  
Sensitivity analysis: Transparency 
Table 5 shows the results of our sensitivity analysis for budget transparency. Model (1) 
replicates the specification from our structural model, with tax growth treated as exogenous and 
standard errors adjusted assuming that observations are clustered by state. Model (2) expands the 
data to include nonelection years, election years where the incumbent is term limited, and cases 
with independent governors. Model (3) adds two additional measures of fiscal outcomes: lagged 
per capita taxes, and the growth rate of state debt. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 Again, the results for our single-equation models are very similar to the structural model 
except that statistical significance decreases with observations clustered by state. Not 
surprisingly, significance returns when we increase the number of cases from 263 to 1362. When 
we add lagged fiscal scale and the growth in state debt, the coefficients on tax growth and lagged 
scale are both positive and significant at the 99 percent level, while the coefficients on 
polarization and legislative competition retain their positive signs but become statistically 
insignificant. This makes sense, in that transparency causes larger tax changes in the structural 
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model, and the lagged level of taxes reflects all those past changes cumulated. Since 
transparency does not change often, over time transparency comes to be associated with larger 
fiscal scale. Overall, consistent with Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006), our results imply that 
transparency is greater in states with larger fiscal scale and highly competitive and polarized 
state politics. Further experiments with variables measuring the partisanship of the governor or 
legislature in this equation yielded coefficients that are essentially zero for the 263 cases in our 
structural model, but a negative, significant coefficient on Democratic legislature in the 
expanded data set used for Model (3). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The formal models of Besley (2006) and Ferejohn (1999) each address the relationship 
between transparency, policy choice, and the accountability of political agents (incumbents). 
Besley assumes incumbents can be good or bad and that transparency can reveal information 
about either the incumbent's type or policy actions. Ferejohn assumes only one kind of 
incumbent and one kind of transparency. Besley assumes transparency is given exogenously, 
while Ferejohn allows it to be determined endogenously by incumbents. Both models 
nonetheless show that policy related transparency can serve the interests of both incumbents and 
voters. Increased transparency can improve voter welfare,29 while offsetting the negative effects 
of tax increases on the incumbent's chances of being reelected.  
Our empirical results in Tables 2 through 5 show how an institutional feature like budget 
process transparency affects whether and how voters attribute responsibility for policy changes 
to incumbents, and how these attributions affect incumbent retention. The results provide a 
degree of support for each of the models we examined. We find that the effect of tax increases on 
                                                
29 In Besley's model, this requires a sufficient screening effect. Of course, we do not observe voter welfare. 
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incumbent retention is negative and statistically significant at low levels of budget transparency, 
but the effect diminishes to zero at higher levels. This holds regardless whether we treat tax 
growth and budget transparency as endogenous or exogenous. The negative effect of tax growth 
is predicted by Besley, but the conditioning effect of budget transparency, while not inconsistent 
with Besley, comes directly from Ferejohn, though only conditional on the unobserved choice to 
invest in action monitoring.  
Ferejohn's model further implies that greater transparency leads to larger fiscal scale, and 
we find that both budget transparency and media penetration have positive effects on tax growth, 
though the statistical significance varies by model, estimation method, and whether we include 
non-election years. Neither Besley nor Ferejohn offers an explanation for the variation in budget 
transparency across states or time. It is not surprising that our results follow Alt, Lassen and 
Rose (2006), given that we use much of the same data. Our contribution here is to estimate a 
structural model that allows for simultaneous causation between the probability that an 
incumbent governor is reelected, tax growth and budget transparency, with results that are 
similar to those we obtain by analyzing each variable separately.  
Pulling it all together, these results suggest that the formal models of Besley and Ferejohn 
are valuable. Both models focus on the incomplete information problem faced by voters in 
seeking to discipline elected agents, though Besley also addresses the screening effects of 
different information regimes. Voters may dislike higher taxes, but the models and results make 
clear that providing better access to information about the underlying policy decisions can alter 
voter reactions to those political choices.  
Finally, politicians are elected not just to be honest (or "congruent" in Besley's terms), but 
also are expected to pursue policies favored by the winning coalition of voters, or perhaps a 
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representative (or median) voter. They are held accountable for failure to meet those 
expectations, as well as for excessive rent seeking.  Our further analysis in Table 4 suggests that 
how much voters are willing to invest in political agents is contingent on the policy preferences 
of agents and their supporting coalition, regardless of whether we interpret the results as 
revealing how the effect of party on fiscal scale is conditional on transparency or how the effect 
of transparency on taxes is conditional on party. Such partisan results are not in either model we 
discuss (both models assume that politicians and voters have homogeneous policy preferences), 
but Meirowitz offers a formal model of competition between politicians in parties in which a 
representative voter can have different reelection rules for each party in equilibrium, such that 
"[p]olicies (or outcomes) that are considered acceptable if implemented by one party may be 
viewed as unacceptable when the other party is in office." (Meirowitz 2007, p. 43). He does not 
address fiscal scale specifically, and does not analyze the effects of differences in transparency. 
As always, there is a tension between a desire for realism and a desire for parsimony, but our 
empirical results suggest that adding at least one more complication to existing models of 





Transparency and Retention in Ferejohn’s Model  
 
Following Ferejohn’s notation, let a be the action chosen by the incumbent, s be the 
signal received by the voter, θ be a noise shock, and start with the reelection rule which is 
“reelect when the signal s (=  a + θ) ≥ s*”. G is a cumulative distribution function for the signal 
s, whose unimodal density g has mean a and standard deviation σ, so the shock θ has mean 0 and 
standard deviation σ. The probability of reelection is then the probability that s ≥ s* - a, or p(a) = 
1 - G(s*-a) (Ferejohn 1999, p. 144) The diagram below shows p(a) as a function of a-s* rather 
than s*-a so that a – the agent’s choice variable – increases as we move from left to right. We 
show this function for two different values of σ. (We have drawn the above diagram as though g 
– the probability density function – is bell-shaped as an example of a unimodal function.) 
 
 




p(a) = 1 – G(s*- a) 
Low σ 
 26 
Observe that, holding (a - s*) constant, a decrease in σ (an increase in transparency, 
moving from the dashed to the solid curve) causes G to decrease and hence p(a) to increase if we 
are on the right-hand side of the graph where (a - s*) > 0. The opposite happens, p(a) decreases, 
if we are on the left-hand side. However, the second-order condition for satisfying Ferejohn’s 
equation (2) ensures that ,if g is unimodal and a is positive, a(s*)> s* (p. 144). This implies that 
we are on the right-hand side. Therefore, conditional on action monitoring taking place, an 
increase in transparency increases the probability of reelection. 
  For any pair of unimodal cumulative distributions, monotonicity means they cross at a 
single point. For convenience we draw that point where a - s* = 0, to the right of which in 
equilibrium action monitoring is chosen. If the agent chooses an action that is greater than the 
threshold level (a - s* > 0), an increase in transparency makes it more likely that the principal 
will perceive this correctly, and thus raises the probability of reelection.  
Of course, the choice of a depends on σ, so we cannot assume that it is fixed. However, 
for a fixed probability of reelection, a - s* gets closer to 0 for a > s* when transparency 
increases. Intuitively, an increase in transparency makes it easier for the principal to correctly 
perceive that the agent’s action is “good enough,” so the agent does not need as much margin for 
error. This tends to offset the effect described above, but doesn’t change the underlying result 
that p(a) increases so long as a > s*. Conversely, if the agent chooses an action that is less than 
the threshold (left-hand side of the diagram where a- s* < 0), an increase in transparency lowers 
the probability of reelection because the principal is more likely to correctly perceive this. But in 
equilibrium no agent offers more transparency and then chooses too small an action. 
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Appendix 2 
Further Details on Data 
 The nine items included in our index of budget transparency are as follows: 
1. Budget is reported using generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). 
 
2. Multiyear expenditure forecasts are used. 
 
3. Budget cycle is annual. 
 
4.  Revenue forecasts are binding. 
 
5.  Legislative branch has or shares responsibility for revenue forecasts. 
  
6.  All appropriations are included in a single bill. 
 
7.  Appropriation bills are written by nonpartisan staff. 
 
8.  Open-ended appropriations are prohibited. 
 
9.  Budget requires published performance measures. 
 
Further details on the rationale for the coding can be found in Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006, p. 37). 
 
 Our index of media coverage reflects the fact that the composition of media suppliers in 
the United States changed considerably during the years included in our data set, due to the 
declining importance of newspapers and the increasing importance of first cable television and 
then the internet. We therefore combine data on newspaper circulation and cable penetration 
rates. Circulation data for daily newspapers are from Editor & Publisher (various) for 1983 and 
1995.30 Cable penetration data are available for most years but are interpolated for 1973-1981 
and 1984-1985.31 Data for cable and newspapers both show distinct trends in opposite directions, 
                                                
30  Circulation figures are for daily newspapers, and state totals are adjusted for newspapers that have national 
circulation. 
31   The cable penetration data come from the Broadcast and Cable Yearbook (which publishes under various titles 
over the years). It contains data on "number of subscribers", by state, published for 1972, 1973, 1978, 1979, and 
1980. There is also data on "number of households with cable" and "penetration in per cent", by DMA (Designated 
Market Area), for 1973, 1982, 1983, and then annually from 1986 on. 
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reflecting the change in the composition of media markets. When combined, the data show a 
general increase in media coverage during the 1970s and 1980s that flattens during the 1990s. 
We label our measure of non-policy related transparency MEDRATE. 
The control variables in our model of budget transparency are drawn from the work of 
Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006). These include political polarization, legislative competition, and 
divided government. Political polarization is measured as the difference in average NOMINATE 
scores for Democrats and Republicans in the state's Congressional delegation. If a state has a 
single-party delegation, we use the population-weighted mean of all contiguous states with two-
party delegations. Legislative competition is measured by the folded Democratic vote share in 
gubernatorial elections, the product of the folded seat shares in the lower and upper houses, and a 
dummy variable for divided government. The first two variables are multiplied by -1 so that 
higher values indicate more competition. Divided government is a simple dummy variable coded 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 
            




Governor is reelected    0.59   0.49   0    1 
 
Budget transparency    0.45   0.20   0    0.89 
 
Tax growth     0.05   0.09  -0.28    0.55 
 
Budget transparency*    0.02   0.04  -0.08    0.19 
Tax growth 
 
Exogenous State-Level Variables 
 
Divided government    0.53    0.50    0      1 
 
Growth in federal transfers   0.04   0.14  -0.73   0.60 
 
Growth in state debt t-2   -0.08   0.13  -0.49   0.57 
 
Income growth     0.03   0.05  -0.24    0.23 
 
Incumbent does not run    0.22   0.42    0    1 
 
Legislative competition   -0.04    0.06  -0.24      0 
 
Ln(Population)   14.82   1.07  12.81  17.27 
 
Media penetration    1.11   0.17   0.71    1.57 
 
Per capita taxest-2            636.35           188.97           222.25         1324.97    
 
Polarization     0.62    0.17   0.24   1.14 
 
Spending growth    0.04   0.07  -0.21    0.30 
 
Unemployment     6.11   2.09   2.40  15.50 
 
Incumbent Governor's Characteristics 
 
Governor's age   53.07   8.30   34  74 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics (cont.) 
            
    Mean  s.d.  Min.  Max.  
 
Lagged vote share  56.24   7.21  36.2  83.2 
 
Lawyer      0.51   0.50    0    1 
 
Years experience  29.22   9.55    6  55 
 
Proportion in politics    0.41   0.24    0    0.96 
 
Years of education  18.91   3.02   11  27 
            
 
Number of cases = 263 
Data for the retention model except for budget transparency, media penetration rates and 
unemployment were graciously provided by Tim Besley. Data on unemployment, taxes and 
government spending have been updated from U.S. Census Bureau (2008). Data on taxes and 
income in the tax growth model are from Besley; data on federal transfers and state debt are from 
U.S. Census Bureau (various). See Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) for sources of variables used to 
predict budget transparency.
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Table 2  Structural Model of Incumbent Retention, Tax Growth and Transparency 
            
 Incumbent Retention     Tax Growth    
               Coef.                 Coef.  
Variable                             (|z|)  Variable    (|z|)  
 
Budget    -0.15  Budget      0.61 
Transparency+   (0.74)  Transparency+   (4.54) 
 
Media penetration   4.4e-4  Media penetration   0.10 
   (0.00)      (1.96) 
 
Tax growth+   -5.32  Incumbent governor  - 0.01 
   (4.31)  is retained+   (0.50) 
 
Budget transparency*    9.57  Incumbent does not   0.02 
Tax growth+   (3.30)  run    (1.01) 
 
Unemployment   -0.03  Unemployment   -0.01 
   (1.74)      (2.21) 
 
Income growth    1.38  Income growth    0.66 
   (1.73)      (5.11) 
 
Spending growth    0.34  Growth in state debtt-2   0.06 
   (0.76)      (1.71) 
 
Ln(population)   -0.03  Growth in federal    0.11 
   (0.96)  transfers    (3.41) 
 
Vote share,   -4.5e-3  Per capita taxest-2   -4.1e-4 
Last election   (1.16)      (6.43) 
 
Governor's Age   -0.02 
   (5.21) 
 
Lawyer    0.04 
   (0.71) 
 
Work Experience    0.01 
   (3.68) 
 
Fraction in     0.47 
Politics   (3.94) 
 
Years of    0.00 
Education   (0.25) 
 
Fixed state effects     No  Fixed state effects   Yes   
 
Fixed year effects     No  Fixed year effects    No 
 
Constant    1.83  Constant     ++   
   (3.31)        
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Table 2  Structural Model (cont.) 
 
            
 Budget Transparency   Budget Transparency*Tax Growth   
               Coef.                 Coef.  
Variable                             (|z|)  Variable    (|z|)  
 
Tax Growth+    0.11  Tax Growth+     0.33 
   (1.61)      (14.91) 
 
Polarization    0.14  Budget Transparency+    0.05 
   (3.55)       (8.91) 
 
Legislative    0.39 
Competition   (2.22) 
 
Divided    0.01 
Government   (0.79) 
 
Fixed state effects    Yes  Fixed state effects    No 
 
Fixed year effects     No  Fixed year effects   Yes 
 
Constant    0.35  Constant    0.04 
   (5.90)      (2.24) 




Number of observations = 263.  
 
R2 = .159 for incumbent retention, .258 for tax growth, .853 for budget transparency, and .856 
for budget transparency*tax growth. 
 
+ indicates endogenous variable. 
++  The estimating procedure dropped the constant term rather than one of the fixed state 
variables.
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Table 3 Sensitivity Analysis: Retention of Incumbent Governors 
        
   Linear 
   Probability  Probit  
 
Budget     0.02                  0.07 
Transparency   (0.15)   (0.15) 
 
Media    -0.01                 0.02 
Penetration   (0.04)   (0.05) 
 
Tax growth  -2.21                -7.44 
    (3.49)   (3.08) 
 
Tax growth*    4.11                13.96 
Transparency   (2.44)   (2.46) 
 
Unemployment   -0.02   -0.07 
    (1.46)   (1.51) 
 
Income growth    0.76    2.32 
    (0.97)   (0.97) 
 
Spending growth    0.08    0.38 
    (0.17)   (0.27) 
 
Ln(population)   -0.03   -0.09 
    (1.09)   (1.17) 
 
Vote share,   -4.6e-3   -0.01 
Last election   (1.12)   (1.19) 
 
Governor's age   -0.02   -0.06 
    (5.32)   (4.85) 
   
Lawyer     0.06    0.19 
    (0.88)   (0.89) 
 
Work      0.01    0.04 
Experience   (3.53)   (3.28) 
 
Fraction in    0.49    1.50 
Politics    (3.89)   (3.75) 
 
Years of      2.7e-3    0.01 
Education   (0.25)   (0.32) 
 
Constant    1.74    3.78  
    (3.23)   (2.27)       
        
 
R2 or pseudo- R2   .224    .182 
        
 
Number of cases = 263. Numbers in parentheses are absolute z-scores with observations clustered by governor.
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Table 4 Sensitivity Analysis: Tax Growth 
 
            
      (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)  
 
Budget                 0.05   0.05               0.04   0.02   
Transparency   (1.91)  (1.84)  (3.91)   (1.50) 
 
Republican     ----   -----                ----   -0.02 
Governor         (2.51) 
 
Rep. Gov.*     ----   -----                ----    0.05 
Transparency         (2.71) 
 
Media penetration   0.16   0.08   3.7e-3   4.9e-3 
    (4.53)  (2.19)              (0.29)  (0.39) 
 
Incumbent does not   0.01   0.02   ----   ---- 
Run    (1.27)  (1.55) 
 
Unemployment   -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
    (2.89)              (4.47)              (6.29)  (6.20) 
 
Income growth     0.73   0.09   0.24   0.23  
    (6.12)  (0.60)              (3.68)  (3.63) 
 
Growth in      0.06   0.01     0.03   0.03 
State debtt-2    (1.46)  (1.11)  (1.76)  (1.76) 
 
Growth in     0.12   0.10   0.02   0.02 
Federal transfers   (3.42)  (2.30)  (1.10)  (1.08) 
 
Per capita taxest-2   -3.6e-4  -3.5e-4  -4.7e-4  -4.8e-4 
     (7.87)  (6.42)            (17.08)             (17.18) 
 
Fixed year effects     No   Yes   Yes   Yes 
 
Constant             0.09               0.34               0.35   0.36 
     (2.28)  (3.34)            (12.64)            (12.84) 
            
 
Cases      263   263  1330  1330 
 
R2     .426  .549   .546   .548 
            
 
Models are estimated using fixed effects vector decomposition, with budget transparency treated as rarely 
changing. Numbers in parentheses are absolute z-scores. Models (1) and (2) use the same cases as the 
structural model. Models (3) and (4) include non-election years and election years when the incumbent is 
term limited. 
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Table 5 Sensitivity Analysis: Budget Transparency 
          
      (1)    (2)    (3)  
 
Tax growth    0.01   0.01   0.10 
    (0.11)  (0.35)  (3.52) 
 
Per capita taxest-2   ---    ----   2.6e-4 
                    (4.27) 
 
Growth in state debt   ---    ----   0.01 
        (0.31) 
 
Political polarization   0.15   0.14   0.04 
    (2.01)  (2.89)  (0.93) 
 
Legislative competition   0.40   0.44   0.27 
    (1.59)  (2.17)  (1.28) 
 
Divided government   0.01  2.4e-3  -1.4e-3 
    (0.58)  (0.22)  (0.15) 
   
Fixed state effects   Yes   Yes   Yes 
 
Constant   0.47   0.34   0.32 
              (10.42)              (7.39)  (4.57) 
          
 
Cases     263  1362  1362 
 
R2    .855  .844   .863 
          
 
Numbers in parentheses are absolute z-scores based on the assumption that observations are clustered by 
state. Model (1) uses the same cases as the structural model. Models (2) and (3) include non-election 
years, election years when the incumbent is term limited, and cases with independent governors. 
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Figure 1 Effect of a Change in Tax Growth from -0.05 to 0.15 on the    



























Figure 2 Effect of a Change in Tax Growth from -0.05 to 0.15 on the    






Results are based on 1,000 simulations calculated for the Probit Model in Table 3, using 
CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2001) v. 2.0. 
 
All variables except Budget Transparency, Tax Growth, and their product are set to their mean 
values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
